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Abstract: In this paper I try to sort out a tangle of issues regarding time, inertia, proper time 
and the so-called “clock hypothesis” raised by Harvey Brown's discussion of them in his recent 
book, Physical Relativity. I attempt to clarify the connection between time and inertia, as well as 
the deficiencies in Newton's “derivation” of Corollary 5, by giving a group theoretic treatment 
original with J.-P. Provost. This shows how both the Galilei and Lorentz transformations may be 
derived from the relativity principle on the basis of certain elementary assumptions regarding 
time. I then reflect on the implications of this derivation for understanding proper time and the 
clock hypothesis. 
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I. Time and Inertia 
In this paper I wish to pursue some reflections about time and inertia that I had begun in 
January 1990. At the time I was engaged in some intensive research on Newton’s 
philosophy of time, and in the light of that research I was moved to reconsider an 
interesting little paper I had read by Jean-Pierre Provost on a group theoretic approach 
to time.1 Although the group theoretic approach makes no appeal to the rods and clocks 
that feature in Harvey Brown’s operationalist approach —and indeed HB does not seem 
to regard the group theoretic approach as very instructive pedagogically— some of the 
tentative conclusions I reached were nonetheless quite similar to his. This prompted me 
to take up those reflections again, in the hope that the contrast between the approaches 
might prove instructive. 
 The first point of contact between my ruminations of the early 1990’s and HB’s 
analysis is the recognition that in Newton’s physics, inertial motion grounds absolute 
time. For where Barrow had been content to allow a clock to be “taken” as equable if it 
appeared to be so —for an instance, an hourglass, or the period of one of Jupiter’s 
moons— Newton insisted that no coherent system of the world could be constructed 
unless an absolute true and mathematical time were presupposed, and according to 
which the astronomical equation of time would be calculated.2 Thus in his scheme a 
body undergoing inertial motion traces out equal displacements in equal times, so that 
the spaces covered are true temporal measures: an inertial body is a clock beating 
absolute time. Equable time is thus internal to inertially moving bodies, that is for 
Newton, bodies moving in absolute space. As Julian Barbour has explained,3 and as 
noted by HB4, this led, through the work of Lange (1886) and others in the late 
nineteenth century, to the definition of “ephemeris time”. There are actually two 
separate problems here concerning equable time, and it is worth remarking on this now 
                                            
1 Provost (1979?). I had first studied Provost’s paper in 1982-3. My studies on Newton in the early 1990s 
issued in the publications Arthur (1994) and (1995). 
2 See my (1995) for a discussion of these points; see also Barbour’s (1989). 
3 Barbour (1989), p. 633. 
4 “Newton already saw the fact that absolute time cannot be defined in terms of the sidereal day. He 
anticipated the notion of ‘ephemeris time which would be employed by the astronomers prior to the 
advent of atomic clocks” (Brown 2005, p. 19). 
 2 
for its relevance to our later discussion of the clock hypothesis in relativity theory. The 
first is Newton’s problem, which is to determine equability by giving a dynamics in which 
forces can be identified, so that even if there is no body actually undergoing perfectly 
inertial motion and thus acting as an ideal clock, such an inertial motion can be 
calculated. Secondly there is Harrison’s problem, so eloquently described by Dava 
Sobel in her book Longitude (1995): to build an actual clock that so far as possible 
mimics an ideal, inertial clock. This, as the tragic story of John Harrison’s quest so 
eloquently attests, is no trivial task to accomplish. 
 But granting all this, there is a problem eloquently described by HB: what he calls 
the “miracle of inertia”. “Inertia, before Einstein's general theory of relativity,” writes HB, 
“was a miracle. By this I ... mean the postulate that force-free ... bodies conspire to 
move in straight lines at uniform speeds while being unable, by fiat, to communicate 
with each other.” (14-15) Otherwise stated, inertial motion is motion at a constant 
velocity in a straight line relative to what? This echoes Einstein’s question: “inertia 
resists acceleration, but acceleration relative to what?” (1954, p. 348). Within classical 
mechanics and the special theory of relativity alike, Einstein continues, “the only answer 
is: inertia resists acceleration relative to space. This is a property of space —space acts 
on objects, but objects do not act on space” (348). This way of regarding matters has 
led some commentators into treating the spacetime metric as an entity, the positing of 
which explains the miracle in question: force-free bodies follow the geodesics much as 
cartwheels followed the ruts in a Roman market road. According to HB, in 1924 Einstein 
himself still thought in this way: 
In 1924 Einstein thought that the inertial property of matter (to be precise, the fact 
that particles with non-zero mass satisfy Newton’s first law of motion, not that they 
possess such inertial mass) requires explanation in terms of the action of a real 
entity on the particles. It is the space-time connection that plays this role: the affine 
geodesics form ruts or grooves in space-time that guide the free particles along 
their way. (141) 
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Matters changed, however, with the realization that Einstein’s field equations 
themselves provide the foundation for the geodesic principle, the principle that “the 
world-lines of force-free test particles are constrained to lie on geodesics of the 
connection“ (141). For the fact that the covariant divergence of the stress energy tensor 
field Tµν vanishes, “came to be recognized as the basis of a proof, or proofs, that the 
world-lines of suitably modelled force-free test particles are geodesics.” (141) Thus in 
GR the geodesic principle is not a postulate, but a theorem. Moreover, because 
external-force-free spinning bodies will deviate from geodesic paths, it “is not an 
essential property of localised bodies that they run along the ruts of space-time 
determined by the affine connection.” Pace Einstein and others, the positing of 
spacetime as an entity does not serve as an explanation for inertial motion, whose 
explanation is in fact only forthcoming in GR.  
 Both classical mechanics and special relativity, on the other hand, take the 
existence of a class of inertial frames for granted. According to HB it is the very positing 
of the existence of these frames “relative to which the above conspiracy, involving 
rectilinear motions, unfolds” that constitutes the content of Newton’s First Law. Lévy-
Leblond said the same thing in 1976: “Indeed the very existence of such equivalent 
reference frames corresponds to the validity of the principle of inertia...” (1976), p. 271. 
 In what follows I am therefore going to take the existence of an equivalence class of 
inertial frames for granted, even though I grant that the justification of their existence is 
only forthcoming in GR. Moreover, following Provost, I will take the equivalence class of 
inertial frames as implicitly defining the space relative to which motions are determined. 
This is a dynamical definition, compatible with the approach of Lange, so eloquently 
described by Barbour in his magisterial book (1989). Indeed, Provost explicitly mentions 
the similarity of his approach to Lange’s.5 The idea is that bodies undergoing inertial 
motions trace out straight lines in space, vector displacements. But the fact that these 
lines are straight, while mathematically part of the understanding of the space as 
Euclidean, is only justified physically by reference to all other inertial systems. 
                                            
5 “A similar approach (apart from group ideas) due to Lange (1885) may be found in “Relativity and 
Cosmology” (Robertson and Noonan, 1968).” The relevant pages are pp. 69-79. 
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 In regarding space simply as a group of translations, however, Provost is not very 
clear about how time is involved. As we shall see, it features in his account only in the 
axiom (Axiom 2 below) that requires translations achieved by an active boost of an 
inertial frame to follow the same additive law that translations achieved by a passive 
boost of a particle do within any one inertial frame. This is that if two such translations 
add to a third, then the combined times taken for the two translations separately is equal 
to the time taken for their vector sum. What is interesting about this is that Newton 
himself was very well aware of this equal time property as being inherent in 
displacements achieved by inertial motions. This is encapsulated in his parallelogram 
law for the composition of motive forces: “A body acted on by [two] forces acting jointly 
describes the parallelogram in the same time in which it would describe the sides if the 
forces were acting separately”.6 This depends on his understanding of motive force 
impressed as being proportional to the change of motion effected in a given time, a 
notion sufficiently important that in composing the Principia Newton decided to give it 
the status of a law, namely the Second Law of Motion; accordingly, he gave the 
parallelogram law the status of a corollary of that Law. Interestingly, however, in one of 
his early manuscripts Newton had given a proof of the vectorial composition of motive 
forces (Arthur 2008b). This proof depends on velocities being derived by (what we 
would now call) an implicit differentiation of displacements, and gives a precise 
justification of the idea that two consecutive inertial motions will effect the same 
displacement as a third effected in the same time if the third is the diagonal of the 
parallelogram. 
 In the Principia the time is assumed to be absolute time, although Newton grants 
that a relative time corresponding to an equable motion may stand in for it. The success 
of the entire dynamics which is built upon this presupposition of inertial motions beating 
out equable times is then the justification of that very presupposition: the definition of 
time is implicit in the first law. Newton assumes that there is a unique frame in which 
motions are absolute, even while granting that his dynamics will not be able to 
distinguish such a frame from one in uniform motion with respect to it. Henceforth I will 
                                            
6 (Newton 1999, p. 417). A more literal translation would be: “A body [carried] by conjoined forces 
describes the diagonal of a parallelogram in the same time as [it would] the sides by the separate forces.” 
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talk about “the stationary frame”, which for Newton means absolute space, but may be 
understood rather to mean any one of an equivalence class of inertial frames relative to 
which Newton’s laws hold.  
 The guiding idea of the present account is that Provost, like Newton, talks of 
relative spaces in motion with respect to one another, rather than using a notion of 
reference frame which is a quadruple of the three orthogonal spatial co-ordinates 
together with a time co-ordinate. Insofar as a time is associated with each frame, it is 
implicit in the equal times principle: two translations (displacements) adding to a third 
will take the same time (in that frame) as their resultant formed by vector composition. 
We will formulate these notions as axioms below. But first I begin with the following 
definition and axiom: 
Definition 1. Inertial Frame: an inertial frame (relative space) consists in a group 
of translations (inertial displacements). The displacements within each frame are 
effected by (point)-bodies undergoing inertial motions, tracing out straight lines in 
a Euclidean space. 
Axiom 1. Principle of Inertia: there exists an infinite class of equivalent reference 
frames in relative motion one to another, forming a (differentiable and connected) 
one-parameter group. 
Any two inertial frames are obviously related to each other by their relative velocity, 
which is the single parameter in question. Now it is a well known theorem of group 
theory that for any (differentiable and connected) one-parameter group there is an 
additive parameter.7 Even though the additive parameter here must be a function of the 
relative velocity of the frames, and can have the dimensions of a velocity, we cannot 
prejudge things and assume that it will be identical to the relative velocity —a fact 
whose significance will become clearer later. So as not to prejudge the issue, we will 
call the additive parameter characterizing the group of inertial frames swiftness and 
abbreviate it with the letter ζ: 
                                            
7 For a thorough discussion of this theorem and its pedagogical utility at a reasonably elementary level, 
see Lévy-Leblond and Provost (1979). 
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Theorem 1: the relative motions of the equivalent inertial frames (relative spaces) 
are parametrized by an additive parameter ζ(v). Their composition law is: ζ12 = ζ1 
+ ζ2. 
II. Time and the Relativity Principle 
But the existence of a stationary frame —which is in fact any one of an equivalence 
class of inertial frames relative to which Newton’s laws hold— together with the 
behaviour of a clock in such a frame, does not tell us anything about how time behaves 
in other frames from the point of view of the stationary frame. For this, we need to 
invoke a Principle of Relativity. Newton does invoke such a principle, his famous 
Corollary 5 of the laws of motion: 
The motions of bodies included in a given space are the same among 
themselves, whether that space is at rest, or moves uniformly forwards in a right 
line without any circular motion.8 
As Julian Barbour has observed, this was described as a hypothesis in earlier drafts, 
but (like the Parallelogram Law) is demoted to the status of a corollary in the Principia 
itself. Barbour thinks this is a mistake (p. 608). He quotes Newton’s proof in full (from 
the Motte translation), noting that (as shown by the words he has italicised) the only 
interactions that Newton considers are those produced by collisions:  
For the differences of the motions tending towards the same parts, and the sums 
of those that tend  toward contrary parts, are, at first (by supposition), in both 
cases the same; and it is from those sums and differences that the collisions and 
impulses do arise with which the bodies impinge upon one another. Wherefore 
(by Law II), the effects of those collisions will be equal in both cases; and 
therefore the mutual motions of the bodies among themselves in the one case 
                                            
8 Barbour quotes from the Motte translation, (Newton 1962, p. 20). In the new translation by Cohen and 
Whitman it reads: “When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one another 
are the same whether the space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly straight forward without 
circular motion.” (Newton 1999, p. 423) 
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will remain equal to the motions of the bodies among themselves in the other. 
(Barbour 1989, p. 577) 
Barbour argues that this is a non sequitur: “there is ... no reason whatever why the 
strength of the interaction (the impulses) between two bodies (to consider the simplest 
case) should be the same when their centre of mass moves through absolute space 
with a uniform velocity as when it is at rest.” (577-578) Newton’s proof of Galilean 
invariance depends on his believing “the forces of interaction to be purely relative and 
directly derivable from the relative configuration of the matter in the world.” (608). HB 
follows Barbour here, identifying Newton’s “extra assumption” as follows: 
As measured by the observer at rest in the frame relative to which the laws of 
motion are initially postulated —let us call this the stationary frame— the forces 
will not depend on the collective state of uniform motion of the system of bodies 
under consideration. ... A similar assumption is being made about the inertial and 
hence gravitational masses.” (37) 
“Without this extra assumption,” HB states, “it is not possible to derive the RP [i.e. 
Relativity Principle] from Newton’s laws and Galilean kinematics.” (38) Yet HB also 
claims that “it is clear that [Newton] was assuming two things. The first was the Galilean 
transformations between inertial frames in relative motion ... But significantly, Newton 
also presupposed the velocity independence of forces and masses.” (37) This is 
confusing, for if the RP —which Barbour has identified with Galilean invariance— is 
derivable from Newton’s laws together with the extra assumptions, it is hard to see why 
Newton would need also to assume it. A partial clarification is achieved, I think, if we 
distinguish the RP or Galilean invariance, on the one hand, from the Galilean 
transformations, on the other. But this still does not explain why HB takes Newton to be 
assuming the Galilean transformations as well as the extra assumption(s). At any rate, 
HB has his mythical “Keinstein” postulate the RP as well as Newton’s extra assumptions 
in order to derive the Galilean transformations (38-40). Here the RP is interpreted as 
yielding the same accelerations under boosts of the system of bodies under 
consideration, given the same initial conditions (38). 
 8 
 Let me try to bring some order into all this. The essential point that Barbour is 
making is that Newton cannot have derived Galilean invariance of interactions from his 
laws alone, since Lorentz-invariant interactions are also compatible with them, and 
accelerations are not Lorentz-invariant. (I independently reached the same conclusion 
about Corollary 1 not following from Newton’s Laws in my reflections in 1990.) But we 
have to be clear about what we mean by “the Relativity Principle”. It cannot simply 
mean that the physics will look the same from within any one inertial frame, no matter 
what its state of motion, since the state of motion of a reference frame (relative space) 
is for Newton defined with respect to absolute space. Newton’s Corollary V implicitly 
assumes a stationary frame with respect to which the relative spaces may be regarded 
as moving or at rest.9 But the vector addition of velocities and motive forces licensed by 
the parallelogram law applies only within that stationary frame and within any other 
equivalent inertial frame: this much Newton says and is entitled to say. Where he errs is 
in supposing not that the laws will look the same from within each relative space (inertial 
frame), but that the vector addition of velocities and motive forces in the moving frame, 
viewed from the stationary frame, will take the same form. Recall that within the 
stationary frame, the displacements in a given time will be as the velocities of inertially 
moving bodies. It is natural to assume that such displacements can instead be effected 
by bodies at rest in a moving relative space, but nothing guarantees that displacements 
produced by the motion of a stationary body in a space moving with velocity v will take 
the same time as a body moving in the stationary space with that velocity: time, 
remember, is tied to inertial motion of bodies within the stationary frame (or of bodies 
within another inertial frame); we do not yet have any criterion to dictate how it applies 
across inertial frames. Otherwise stated: the displacement produced in the stationary 
frame by a body at rest in a moving frame (relative space) will depend on the velocity of 
the relative space, but it will not necessarily be identical to the displacement produced 
by the same body moving in the stationary frame with that velocity. Granted, it is only in 
hindsight that we can see that this identification is not necessary: as we noted above, 
                                            
9 In my (1994) I argue that it is wrong to interpret Newton’s Corollary 5 as a statement of the Galilean 
equivalence of inertial motions, since a true inertial motion is one produced by a force. Coroll. 5 states 
rather that the relative motions remain the same among themselves whether the body is moving or at rest 
in absolute space. 
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the fact that inertial transformations form a differentiable, connected, one-parameter 
group allows us to infer the existence of an additive parameter that is a function of the 
velocity, but not necessarily to identify it with the velocity. 
 So we need further assumptions in addition to our Principle of Inertia. First, 
following Provost, I will give the Relativity Principle the following concrete formulation: 
we assume that any displacement x within an inertial frame may be realized by the 
motion of a body at rest in a second inertial frame in relative motion to the first.  
Axiom 2. Relativity Principle: any displacement x in any one inertial frame can be 
realized by an active boost of a point-particle at rest in a second inertial frame in 
motion relative to the first with a swiftness ζ. 
Provost calls these “dynamical translations”, as opposed to merely “geometrical” ones 
(456). I shall call them “boost displacements”. In order for this to be physically realistic, 
we need to make the further assumption that the relative swiftness ζ of 2 inertial frames 
changes sign under change of sign of all the spatial axes: 
Axiom 3. Space reflection property: if x → –x, ζ →  –ζ. Or, ζ(–x) = –ζ(x) 
(For simplicity’s sake, I will not use full vector notation, but follow Provost in running the 
argument with one spatial dimension. It can readily be generalized to three.) 
 Now we need to consider time. As we saw, within an inertial frame Newton’s 
parallelogram law demands that any two inertial displacements adding to a third must 
be effected in equal times. Therefore, according to the RP, so must any two boost 
displacements adding to a third, if they are successfully to realize the inertial ones. This 
gives us the following principle, original with Provost: 
Axiom 4. Equal Time Principle: if three boost displacements x1, x2, x3 satisfy x1 + 
x2 = x3, then the displacements on both sides of the equation have been realized 
in equal times. 
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Finally, in order for these assumptions to succeed in implicitly defining time we also 
need to stipulate that at least some of the intervals so defined keep the same sign in all 
reference frames, otherwise causal processes will be impossible: 
Axiom 5. Causality Condition: there exist time intervals that are invariant under 
transformations associated with any swiftness ζ. 
Now the intriguing thing about Provost’s approach is that on the basis of these 
assumptions concerning time, inertia and relativity, it is possible to prove that Galilean 
and Lorentzian invariance are the only two possibilities for transformation groups. 
Provost’s proof sketch proceeds as follows: 
 Consider a stationary frame R with swiftness ζ, and a second inertial frame R′ 
undergoing an infinitesimal boost ε in it so that ζ′ = ζ – ε. I am going to assume the 
linearity of these transformations; this follows from the homogeneity of spacetime. HB 
himself outlines two different ways of proving linearity from homogeneity (26-28), one of 
which is given a general treatment in Lévy-Leblond (1976). Given linearity, the 
displacements will be transformed as  
x′ =  x –  ε x f(ζ)         (1) 
f(ζ ′) = f(ζ –  ε) = f(ζ) – ε df/dζ       (2) 
where f(ζ) is a function of the swiftness ζ with dimension of [1/ ζ] = [1/v] = L–1T, so that x 
f(ζ) is the time for the boost displacement. Now the equality of times principle, Axiom 4, 
therefore gives: 
x3 f(ζ 3) = x1 f(ζ 1) + x2 f(ζ 2)        (3) 
Meanwhile  
x′ f(ζ′) =  [x –  ε x f(ζ)] f(ζ′)      from (1) 
 =  [x –  ε x f(ζ)] [f(ζ) – ε df/dζ]    from (2) 
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   =  x f(ζ) –  ε x [ f2(ζ) + df/dζ] – o(ε)2     (4) 
and since (3) holds also for x1′ f(ζ′), x2′ f(ζ′), and x3′ f(ζ′), we obtain 
x3 [ f2(ζ3) + df/dζ3)] = x1 [ f2(ζ1) + df/dζ1] + x2 [ f2(ζ2) + df/dζ2]    (5) 
Compatibility of equations (3) and (5) with x1 + x2 = x3 from Axiom 4 requires: 
 f2(ζ) + df/dζ =  λ f(ζ) + µ        (6) 
where λ and µ are constants. By Axiom 3, the function f(ζ) must be odd, giving 
f2(ζ) – df/dζ =  –λ f(ζ) + µ        (7) 
Adding (6) and (7) gives 
f2(ζ) =  µ          (8) 
 ⇒ df/dζ = 0           (9) 
Subtracting (7) from (6) gives 
df/dζ =  λ f(ζ)          (10) 
so that, by (9), λ is identically zero: λ  = 0.      (11) 
According to (8) we therefore have three cases, corresponding to µ =  0, µ > 0, µ  < 0. 
In all three cases t = x f(ζ) for the boost displacement, and since by Axiom 2 this boost 
displacement x must equal the inertial displacement vt, we have v = 1/f(ζ). Moreover, 
from (1) we have 
x′ =  x –  ε x f(ζ) =  x –  εt        (12) 
and from (4) and (6) we obtain 
t′ = x′ f(ζ′) =  x f(ζ) –  ε x µ        (13) 
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Equations (12) and (13) are the infinitesimal versions of the group laws for the Galilei 
group (µ  =  0), the Lorentz group (µ > 0), and rotations in spacetime (µ  < 0). The 
lattermost transformation group is ruled out by the causality condition (Axiom 5).10 We 
can solve for cases 1 and 2 as follows: 
Case 1: µ = 0. f2(ζ) + df/dζ = 0 
    ⇒ dζ  =  –df/f2 
    ⇒ ζ =  1/f (since f = 0 when ζ = 0) 
    ⇒ f(ζ) =  1/ζ  
Thus v = 1/f(ζ) =  ζ, as Newton had assumed. From (12) and (13) we therefore get the 
1-dimensional Galilean transformations: 
x′ = x –  vt          (14) 
t′ = t           (15) 
Case 2: µ > 0. f2(ζ) + df/dζ = µ.  
For ease of calculation we let µ = 1/k2, where k is a positive constant with the 
dimensions of a velocity. Now 
    ⇒ dζ  =  df/(1/k2 – f2) = k2df/(1 – k2f2)  
    ⇒ f(ζ) = 1/k coth(ζ/k) 
Thus v = 1/f(ζ) = k tanh(ζ/k).  
The constant k is subsequently determined to be the velocity of light in a vacuum, c. If 
instead of our swiftness ζ  we take the dimensionless quantity ϕ  = ζ/c, this is the 
dimensionless group parameter that relativity textbooks define as the rapidity, ϕ =    
                                            
10 See Lévy-Leblond (1976, p. 276), Lee and Kalotas 1975, pp. 435-6), Rindler (1977, p. 52) and Lévy-
Leblond and Provost (1979, p. 1048). 
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tanh-1(v/c). In terms of the rapidity ϕ the Lorentz transformation formulas take the simple 
form: 
    x′  = x cosh ϕ –  ct sinh ϕ 
    ct′ = ct cosh ϕ – x sinh ϕ 
 Harvey Brown, commenting on a related derivation by Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond 
(1976) of the Lorentz transformations without any assumptions about light —which he 
calls the Ignatowski transformations, in honour of their first discoverer11— “sounds a 
warning” about whether the transformations derived “are indeed relativistic in nature” 
(146, 109). “Unless the magnitude of the invariant speed is established”, he writes, “the 
Ignatowski group can hardly be equated with the Lorentz group”. Granted; but as 
Wolfgang Rindler comments on similar derivations without the light postulate, “the role 
of a ‘second postulate’ in relativity is now clear: it merely has to isolate one or the other 
of these transformation groups. Any second postulate consistent with the RP but not 
with the GT isolates the LT group”, i.e. determines that µ = 1/k2 —although, as he adds, 
only a quantitative determination, for instance “at speed 3c/5, there is a time dilation by 
a factor 5/4”, will determine the Lorentz group, with µ = 1/k2 and k = c, equal to the value 
of the speed of light in vacuo.12 Also, as Rindler points out, such a quantitative 
determination can also be obtained in various other ways, from the relativistic mass 
increase, or from the equivalence of mass and energy (E = mc2), etc. This hardly makes 
this derivation less relativistic, or indeed less empirical. (Indeed, Provost entitles his 
paper “A truly relativistic approach [to] the concept of time”!) 
 The situation is well summarized by Lévy-Leblond in the following passage, and 
HB’s approving quotation of the second sentence (p. 146) and also of the idea of SR as 
a “super law” (p. 147) seem to signal his agreement: 
                                            
11 The earliest derivation of the Lorentz transformations without the light postulate were given by W. v. 
Ignatowski (also spelt Ignatowsky) in 1910 and 1911; other versions are due to Frank and Rothe (1911, 
1912), L. A. Pars (1921), and Lee and Kalatos (1975). They were then rediscovered independently by 
Lévy-Leblond (1976), and again by N. David Mermin (1984). Whenever I hear of Ignatowski I picture the 
character of that name played by Christopher Lloyd in the television comedy Taxi (presumably in jesting 
homage to the real Ignatowski); Taxi’s Ignatowski had been a mathematical genius at Harvard before he 
blew his mind and a stellar academic career through drugs. 
12 Rindler (1977), p. 52-53. 
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All the laws of physics are constrained by special relativity acting as a sort of 
“super law”, and electromagnetic interactions here have no privilege other than a 
historical and anthropocentric one. Relativity theory, in fact, is but the statement 
that all laws of physics are invariant under the Poincaré group (inhomogeneous 
Lorentz group). (1976, p. 271) 
 Thus, since the Minkowski metric is a straightforward consequence of invariance 
under the Poincaré group, it has all the empirical content deriving from the Lorentz 
invariance of all physical laws. Moreover, the preceding Provostian derivation of the 
Galilei and Lorentz transformations demonstrates the pedagogical utility of the group 
theoretic approach, while at the same time showing that the relativity principle does 
have precise empirical content. It is not necessary to presuppose, as did Newton, that 
the acceleration is invariant under a boost of inertial frame (relative space). This is the 
extra assumption pointed out by Barbour, that vitiates Newton’s derivation of Corollary 
5. Under a Lorentz transformation, acceleration is not invariant. But the non-invariance 
of accelerations under such a boost is shown by the above analysis to be a 
consequence of the fact that the velocity is not identical with the rapidity. As Lévy-
Leblond and Provost express it in a co-written paper, it shows the need “to replace the 
Galilean velocity by two separate concepts: ‘velocity’ v, as expressing the time rate of 
change of position, and ‘rapidity’ ϕ, as the natural additive group parameter.” (1979, p. 
1045). The Galilean transformations are a kind of degenerate limit of the Lorentzian 
ones:13 µ (= 1/c2), instead of having a definite positive value, takes the value 0.  From 
this perspective, Newton’s (entirely understandable) mistake was not in his assumption 
that a displacement of a body in absolute space could be effected by an equivalent 
boost of a body at rest in a relative space —the relativity principle— but in his 
assumption that such a displacement would thereby be effected in the absolute space in 
a time equal to that taken by a body moving inertially. Thus on the above Provostian 
construal, Newton has not made three independent presuppositions —Galilean 
invariance, the velocity-independence of forces, and the velocity-independence of 
masses— but only one, namely, the latter one concerning time. 
                                            
13 Cf. Lévy-Leblond (1976), p. 276: “Our four general hypotheses thus suffice to single out the Lorentz 
transformations and their degenerate Galilean limit as the only possible inertial transformations.” 
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III. Proper Time and the Clock Hypothesis 
These latter remarks prompt me to return to the question of the status of SR. In 
discussing the “miracle of inertia” above, we saw that HB was trenchantly opposed to 
interpretations of spacetime as an entity which constrains inertial bodies to follow its 
affine grooves. In this connection he quotes an eloquent passage from Robert DiSalle: 
When we say that a free particle follows, while a particle experiencing a force 
deviates from, a geodesic of spacetime, we are not explaining the cause of the 
difference between two states or explaining ‘relative to what’ such a difference 
holds. Instead we are giving the physical definition of a spacetime geodesic. To 
say that spacetime has the affine structure thus defined is not to postulate some 
hidden entity to explain the appearances, but rather to say that empirical facts 
support a system of physical laws that incorporates such a definition. (DiSalle 
1995, Brown 2005, p. 25) 
In keeping with this, HB insists it “is more natural in theories such as Newtonian 
mechanics or SR ... to consider the 4-connection as a codification of certain key aspects 
of the behaviour of particles and fields” (142).  
 With all of this I am in full agreement. But HB often writes as if the 4-connection or 
Minkowski metric is purely geometrical, and devoid of physical content.14 A case in point 
is his portrayal of proper time. This I consider to have been one of the great discoveries 
of twentieth century physics. I have written elsewhere (2008a) on the metaphysical and 
physical significance of this bifurcation of the classical time concept into two separate 
concepts that perform two distinct roles in relativistic physics: the correlating of distant 
events as prior to, simultaneous with, or after, some given event; and the determining of 
how fast things age, that is how fast the properties of a given system change, or how 
fast the states of a given process follow one another. In SR coordinate time performs 
the first role, and proper time the second. This degeneracy of the classical time concept 
                                            
14 He remarks, for instance: “Mathematically of course the tangent spaces are automatically 
Minkowskian, but the issue is one of physics, not mathematics.” (p. 9) 
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is, of course, related to the degeneracy of the classical velocity concept discussed 
above. 
 Minkowski introduced the concept of proper time in his famous 1908 paper (Lorentz 
et al. 1923, 73-91). He asked his readers to imagine at any point P (x, y, z, t) in 
spacetime a worldline running through that point, whose magnitude corresponding to 
the timelike vector dx, dy, dx, dt laid off along the line is  
dτ = √(c2dt2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2)/c 
Then he wrote: “The integral  τ = ∫ dτ  of this quantity, taken along the worldline from 
any fixed starting point P0 to the variable endpoint P, we call the proper time of the 
substantial point at P.” (85) 
 But compare this with what HB writes: 
If the accelerative forces are small in relation to the internal restorative forces of 
the clock, then the clock’s proper time will be proportional to the Minkowski 
distance along its world-line. Consider two events A and B lying on this time-like 
world-line. The distance along the world-line between these events is given by  
∫ΑΒ ds, where ds
2 = c2dt2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2 in inertial co-ordinates. 
Here we see Minkowski’s proper time characterized as “the Minkowski distance” and 
contrasted with the clock’s proper time. It’s almost as if HB wants to take away the 
credit from Minkowski and portray proper time as the empirical time, in contrast to the 
merely geometrical time of the four dimensional representation. Proper time, on HB’s 
way of looking at it, is the reading we actually get from a clock. It will only agree with the 
integration of the line element along the object’s path in spacetime if it is true that the 
‘restorative effects’ in the clock’s mechanism are not disturbed by its motion along this 
path. This is the condition referred to as “the clock hypothesis”, the claim that “when a 
clock is accelerating, the effect of motion on the rate of the clock is no more than that 
associated with its instantaneous velocity —the acceleration adds nothing” (9): 
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[The distance along a worldline between two events] is a sum, in other words, of 
‘straight’ infinitesimal elements ds: the effect of motion on the clock depends 
accumulatively only on it[s] instantaneous speed, not its acceleration. This 
condition is often referred to as the clock hypothesis, and its justification, as we 
have seen, rests on accelerative forces being small in the appropriate sense. 
(95) 
 But this seems to me a misleading way of describing the state of affairs. If we agree 
with HB about spacetime or the 4-D connection not being an entity but a “codification of 
certain key aspects of the behaviour of particles and fields” (142), and that the 
codification in question here is the “Lorentz invariance of the complete quantum 
dynamics, known or otherwise, involved in the cohesion of matter” (126), then —
provided the empirical evidence supports SR and the clock hypothesis— ideal clocks 
will conform to Minkowskian geometry. One need not, as HB says J. S. Bell recognized, 
“know exactly how many distinct forces are at work, nor have access to the detailed 
dynamics of all of these interactions or the detailed micro-structure of individual rods 
and clocks” (126). And if ideal clocks locally conform to Minkowskian geometry through 
the Lorentz invariance of their dynamics, their proper time will be the path integral along 
an arbitrary timelike line, provided they also conform to the clock hypothesis. It is in this 
sense that, as Rindler (1977, 43) argues, the “clock hypothesis” may be “regarded as 
the definition of an ‘ideal’ clock.” It is a separate question whether any real clocks can 
be found that will measure proper time accurately —that is what I referred to earlier as 
Harrison’s problem, as opposed to Newton’s. Generally speaking, a real clock will 
function as an ideal one “if [its] internal driving forces greatly exceed the accelerating 
force” (Rindler, 1977, 43). But if the time kept by such a clock were found to vary with 
acceleration (over and above the dilation due to the cumulative changes in its 
instantaneous speed), then this would refute the clock hypothesis. This would indeed 
require some new dynamics, but it would not show that Minkowski’s proper time was 
somehow purely geometrical.  
  “There should be no mystery,” HB concludes, “as to why clocks are waywisers of 
space-time.” (95) Indeed; and I agree that this is a consequence of the dynamics, rather 
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than due to the action of spacetime or the affine connection on bodies. But it is a result 
of SR being a kind of “super law” governing the appropriate dynamical reactions, 
together with the empirical truth of the clock hypothesis, not a consequence of “the 
operational meaning of the metric [being] ultimately made possible by appeal to 
quantum theory” (9). We do not need to know the “detailed dynamics of all of these 
interactions or the detailed micro-structure of individual rods and clocks” in order to 
know that the dynamical laws are Lorentz invariant. As the Provostian derivation shows, 
Lorentz invariance can be interpreted as following from the Relativity Principle and 
certain assumptions about time that are independent of considerations of rods and 
clocks, and of all questions of synchronization of clocks. And given this Lorentz 
invariance together with the clock hypothesis, we know that clocks will be the waywisers 
of spacetime. 
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